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Note
A Missing Variable: The Impact of Cross-Border
Insolvency Laws on Foreign Direct Investment
Jason Jack
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decisions are based on a
variety of factors including economic conditions, diplomatic
connections, and simple supply and demand, but the stability
and development of a state’s insolvency laws are factors that are
often overlooked.1 The World Bank provides a score for legal
rights of creditors in a given state2 and data on FDI inflows for
most countries of the world.3 An analysis of these two figures
shows that states with more developed legal rights for creditors
generally tend to have higher levels of FDI. There are several
examples of states whose net inflows of FDI increased
substantially from one year to another immediately following
revisions and updates to insolvency laws.4 Some countries
differentiate between cross-border and domestic insolvency,
while others use the same system for foreign and domestic
creditors and debtors.5 Among the variety of approaches, it is

Jason Jack is a J.D. Candidate for the class of 2018 at the University of
Minnesota Law School. The author would like to thank the Minnesota Journal
of International Law Editors and Staff for their assistance in the publication
process and Professor Paul Vaaler for his guidance while developing this article.
1. See ASHOKA MODY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 38–39 (2007).
2. World Development Indicators: Financial access, stability, and
efficiency, THE WORLD BANK (2016), http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.5.
3. Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows, THE WORLD BANK WORLD
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, [hereinafter WORLD BANK FDI] http://data
bank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=BX.KLT.DINV.CD.W
D&country (data accessed and saved on Nov. 13, 2017, on file with Minnesota
Journal of International Law).
4. Compare id., with Michael Bader & Mark Montari, Swiss Debt
Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law, in WORLD INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, 629, 669;
Dmitry Kurochkin, Overview of Russian Insolvency Law, in WORLD
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 587, 587; Andrew Tetley, New Zealand, in WORLD
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 507, 508 (Otto Eduardo Fonseca
Lobo, ed., 2009).
5. See R.W. Harmer, Report for Australia, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY,
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clear that corporations and individuals engaging in FDI consider
insolvency laws as a significant factor that has usually been
overlooked in other studies of FDI decisions.
This Note will explore the impact of cross-border insolvency
laws on FDI. Its purpose is to understand how insolvency laws
impact FDI decisions of individuals and corporations. Part I
provides a background of statistics and previous studies of FDI.
It also provides a brief overview of bankruptcy to better
understand the significance of the issues in Part II. Part II
describes how various factors of insolvency laws impact FDI
decisions. It does this by providing specific examples of
insolvency law reforms having a direct impact on FDI. This Note
concludes that improvement and modernization of insolvency
laws usually has an immediate and direct impact on FDI.
I.

DESCRIBING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY

In 2015, global FDI totaled just over $2 trillion United
States dollars (USD).6 Each country receives an average of $11
billion USD.7 Unfortunately, the average contains many outliers
that skew the results. Developed countries tend to have higher
FDI amounts than developing countries.8 For example, slightly
less than half of global FDI occurred in just six countries.9 It is
also important to note that a significant portion of FDI is due to
corporate mergers and acquisitions of existing corporations
rather than investment in new enterprises.10

22, 30 (stating there are no separate rules or procedures for domestic or foreign
creditors to bring claims); Makoto Ito, Report for Japan, in CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES, REPORTS DELIVERED AT
THE XIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, MONTREAL 1990
178, 182 (Ian F. Fletcher, ed., 1992) (stating that territorial creditors are given
priority in bankruptcy proceedings).
6. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. See J. Peter Neary, Trade Costs and Foreign Direct Investment, in
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 25
(Steven Brackman & Harry Garretssen eds., 2008); WORLD BANK FDI, supra
note 3 (showing around 50 percent of global FDI went to Mainland China, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States).
9. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3 (showing Mainland China, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States received
$854,327,416,626 billion in foreign direct investment in 2015).
10. Neary, supra note 8, at 25–26.
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A. EVALUATING FDI
A variety of factors are considered when individuals and
corporations decide to engage in FDI in a particular state. The
most significant factors are labor cost, corporate taxes, and
market size.11 Other significant factors include geopolitical
considerations, government stability, government support of
private business activity, and the overall quality of a state’s legal
system.12 Different entities and industries would rank the
importance of each of these factors differently. For example, a
newer company may be especially interested in government
subsidization programs while a more established company may
be more concerned with long-term corporate tax rates.
Some countries try to encourage FDI within their borders
through policies such as tax breaks or preferential loans and
grants.13 One study that evaluated FDI concluded that United
States corporations engaged in FDI undertook less FDI as new
trade agreements were implemented.14 Corporations tend to
favor FDI where they can take advantage of tax loopholes and
concessions rather than equal treatment under treaties.15 Other
policy decisions designed to influence FDI include funding for
research and development and education programs designed to
train skilled laborers.16
A few countries have formally recognized a link between
insolvency laws and FDI. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is
currently working to reform of its insolvency laws specifically to
encourage FDI.17 While the UAE currently has bankruptcy
procedures in place, debtors are still subject to criminal
penalties for non-payment of debts, even while working through
11. MODY, supra note 1, at 17.
12. See id. at 38–39. The list includes twenty-nine factors. It is interesting
to note that insolvency laws are not mentioned on this list despite statistics
showing it is a significant factor often considered. See id.
13. Magnus Blomstrum & Ari Kokko, The Economics of Foreign Direct
Investment Incentives, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE REAL AND
FINANCIAL SECTOR OF INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 37 (Heinz Hermann & Robert
Lipsey, eds., 2003).
14. MODY, supra note 1, at 17.
15. Id.
16. C. Bellak, M. Leibrecht, & R. Stehrer, POLICIES TO ATTRACT FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: AN INDUSTRY-LEVEL ANALYSIS, OECD GLOBAL F. ON
INT’L INV. (2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40301081.pdf.
17. Tom Arnold, Bankruptcy Law to Bring FDI Boost, THE NAT’L (Feb. 1,
2013),
http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/economics/
bankruptcy-law-to-bring-fdi-boost.
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bankruptcy proceedings.18 Policies such as this would cause
most evaluating FDI opportunities in the UAE to consider the
severe consequences if an investment opportunity were to fail.19
Even with discussion of reforms, the UAE currently has a very
low score in the World Bank’s Legal Rights Index that will
continue to impact FDI decisions.20
B. OVERVIEW OF INSOLVENCY
Many countries choose to emulate the bankruptcy processes
and rights found in the United States.21 For example, when
updating and reforming its bankruptcy laws in 2006, China
based parts of their codes on United States bankruptcy
procedures.22 Instead of rigid standards, the system is described
as “[a] controlled, preset process, with clearly delineated
boundaries, inside of which the parties have great flexibility to
arrive at their own solutions.”23 How the United States
addresses cross-border insolvency is a guiding standard for
developing countries, as well as any state working to update
insolvency laws.24
Since bankruptcy laws in the United States are influential
in international cross-border insolvency proceedings, a basic
overview of United States bankruptcy procedures is useful in
understanding the broader issues. It is first important to
understand the technical distinction between “insolvency” and
“bankruptcy.” “Insolvency” generally refers to the status of an
individual or corporation being unable to pay debt.25
“Bankruptcy” generally refers to the legal process used to resolve
insolvency of a debtor.26 In practice, these terms are often used

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
21. See Joseph Wielebinski & Davor Rukavina, An Overview of the
Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Practice in the United States, in WORLD
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 693.
22. Rebecca Parry & Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Bankruptcy Law:
Notable Features and Key Enforcement Issues, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
LAW, REFORMS AND CHALLENGES 85, 90 (Paul Omar, ed., 2013).
23. Wielebinski & Rukavina, supra note 21, at 694.
24. Id.
25. See David Kirk, What is the Difference Between Bankruptcy and
Insolvency?, THE GAZETTE, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/insolvency/content/
100329 (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).
26. See id.
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interchangeably and some countries may have slightly different
or very specific legal definitions of each. While most countries
have a broad definition of each, Gibraltar has a very specific
definition of insolvency being declared when a company owes
£500 to any one creditor for over three weeks.27
Once one has become insolvent, the usual procedure is to
begin a bankruptcy proceeding.28 The most common proceedings
are liquidation and reorganization.29 In liquidation, a
bankruptcy court may appoint a trustee to manage and liquidate
an estate on behalf of an individual debtor.30 A trustee is
specifically authorized to collect the assets of an estate, liquidate
these assets, adjudicate claims, and make distributions to
creditors on behalf of the debtor.31 However, in practice, most
individual debtors remain in possession of their estate.32
Businesses may liquidate or reorganize and a trustee is
generally not appointed in the process.33 In rare circumstances,
such as when fraud or gross mismanagement has taken place, a
court may appoint a trustee to oversee a business bankruptcy
proceeding.34
The prevalence of multinational corporations, improved
communications, and liberalized trade policies work together to
make international insolvency an important issue today. Crossborder insolvency can have direct impacts on consumers. For
example, the August 31, 2016, bankruptcy filing by Hanjin
Shipping, a South Korean company, resulted in $14 billion in
cargo being essentially stranded at sea while negotiations took
place with creditors and while awaiting court orders protecting
Hanjin from having ships seized upon entry into ports all around
the world.35 A United States bankruptcy court was asked to
27. Issac Marrache, Gibraltar, in WORLD INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, supra note
4, at 364.
28. Wielebinski & Rukavina, supra note 21, at 695.
29. Id. at 706–07 (explaining that individuals usually liquidate while
businesses usually reorganize, but either method is available to both
individuals and businesses).
30. Id. at 706.
31. Id. at 715
32. Elizabeth Stong, United States, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 409, 425 (James R. Sikenat &
Charles D. Schmerler, eds., 2006).
33. Id. at 425.
34. Id.
35. Natalie Kitroeff, Hanjin Bankruptcy is the Tip of the Iceberg for Flailing
Shippers, LA TIMES (Sep. 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-hanjin-shipping-industry-crisis-20160913-snap-story.html.
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determine if the lien rights available under United States law
were enforceable even though a Korean court had issued a stay
on creditor liens.36 The Korean order was formally recognized
and adopted by the United States Bankruptcy Court.37 The court
cited the United States adoption of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”) in reaching its
decision.38
The objective of the Model Law, as described in the official
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation is “to assist States to
equip their insolvency laws with a modern legal framework to
more effectively address cross-border insolvency proceedings
concerning debtors experiencing severe financial distress or
insolvency.”39 The Model Law defines cross-border insolvency as
proceedings in which a debtor has assets in more than one state
or creditors in a different state from where the bankruptcy is
occurring.40 Facilitation of international trade was a central
policy guiding the creation and implementation of the Model
Law.41 More specifically, the Model Law was designed to address
issues of transparency, coordination, and conflicting laws.42
On March 29, 2017, Westinghouse, a company specializing
in constructing and maintaining nuclear reactors worldwide,43
filed for bankruptcy.44 The corporation is based in the United
States but is a subsidiary of Toshiba, a Japanese corporation.45
The Asia division of Westinghouse includes plants in China,
Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam.46
36. In re Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 16-27041, 2016 WL 6679487, at *5
(Bankr. N.J. Sept. 20, 2016).
37. Id. at *6.
38. Id. at *4.
39. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to
Enactment and Interpretation, UNCITRAL (2013), http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2017).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Diane Cardwell & Jonathan Soble, Westinghouse Files for Bankruptcy,
in Blow to Nuclear Power, NY TIMES, (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/westinghouse-toshiba-nuclear-bankruptcy.
html?_r=1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Westinghouse Asia, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghousenuclear.
com/About/Regional-Operations/Asia (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).

2018]

CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY LAWS & FDI

319

Westinghouse also operates in nine countries in Europe as well
as South Africa and the UAE.47 Just one corporate bankruptcy
will potentially involve claims or liquidation of assets from at
least nineteen countries which demonstrates how widespread
FDI activities and cross-border insolvency proceedings can be in
just one corporation.48
The development of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which was
formally adopted in 1997, has been an important development
in cross-border insolvency.49 The Model Law has been
particularly helpful in resolving issues of jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings.50 For example, the Model Law, as
adopted in the United States Bankruptcy Code, requires courts
to evaluate a corporation’s “Center of Main Interests” (COMI) in
determining proper jurisdiction.51 Factors used to determine
COMI include location of headquarters, location of those who
actually manage the debtor, location of debtor’s primary assets,
location of the majority of debtor’s creditors, and the jurisdiction
whose law would apply in most disputes.52
While the Model Law was immediately influential, its
significance and influence greatly improved when most of its
provisions were added to the United States Bankruptcy Code in
2005.53 Before the provisions were formally added to the
Bankruptcy Code, United States bankruptcy courts had broad
discretion in choosing to cooperate with foreign bankruptcy
proceedings.54 This created uncertainty for foreign and domestic
47. Westinghouse
Europe/Middle
East/Africa,
WESTINGHOUSE,
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/About/Regional-Operations/EMEA (last
visited Apr. 7, 2017).
48. Westinghouse Americas, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghouse
nuclear.com/About/Regional-Operations/Americas (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
Westinghouse operates twenty-five facilities in the United States, most of which
are nuclear power plants, and an additional plant in Brazil which brings the
total to nineteen countries. See id.
49. UNCITRAL, supra note 39.
50. Megan R. O’Flynn, The Scorecard So Far: Emerging Issues in CrossBorder Insolvencies Under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 32 NW J.
INT’L. & BUS. 391, 403 (2012).
51. Id.
52. In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 371
B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
53. O’Flynn, supra note 50, at 396.
54. Id. But see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895) (“Where there has
been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent
jurisdiction . . . under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries . . . .”).
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debtors and creditors. The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law made consideration of foreign court proceedings
mandatory.55 So far, over 100 United States bankruptcy cases
have cited the UNCITRAL provisions in decisions.56 As the
United States continues to use the UNCITRAL Model Law for
guidance, more countries will look to its provisions for guidance
in formulating their own policy. Its use in the United States adds
case law and further legitimizes the Model Law standards.
One example of UNCITRAL Model Law being applied in
United States courts is found in the case of Jaffé v. Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd.57 The court was asked to determine if the
specific foreign bankruptcy proceeding in progress at the that
time was to be recognized by United States courts.58 The Court
specifically mentioned Chapter 15 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code being added in order to incorporate the Model
Law.59 Based on the provisions of Chapter 15, the court
determined that it was required to recognize the foreign
proceeding in question.60
Another example of a United States court citing the Model
Law can be found in the case In re Betcorp Ltd.61 At issue was
an Australian insolvency proceeding and whether the “winding
up” of a business in Australia would be recognized in United
States courts.62 The Bankruptcy Court cited the Model Law and
considered Australia’s interpretation of the application of the
Law as persuasive.63 Specifically, the court determined the
insolvency in question would fall under Australian
interpretation that “[Australian] company laws qualify under
the Model Law.”64 This allowed the United States Court to
recognize the Australian proceedings which provided protection
for the debtor’s interests in the United States.65
55. Id.
56. Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts: United States of America, UNCITRAL
(2016),
http://www.uncitral.org/clout/search.jspx?f=en%23cloutDocument.
country-ref0_s%3aUnited%5c+States%5c+of%5c+America (last visited Sept.
10, 2017).
57. Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013).
58. Id. at 18.
59. Id. at 23.
60. Id. at 24.
61. In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009).
62. Id. at 271.
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 271.
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Foreign corporations with significant assets in the United
States have also benefitted from emergency proceedings in
United States bankruptcy courts. One extreme but illustrative
example is found in the case of In re Yukos Oil Co.66 The company
was incorporated in Russia and subject to forced sale of its global
assets based on government decisions in Russia.67 The
corporation had bank accounts in the United States as well as
fifteen percent of its outstanding shares held in the United
States.68 The Court determined that the accounts and shares
gave the United States jurisdiction to issue an emergency order
temporarily enjoining the sale of the corporation’s assets against
all creditors except the Russian government.69 The delay
provided through United States bankruptcy law was a factor
that allowed arbitration to take place, eventually resulting in an
approximately $50 billion judgment against the government of
Russia for its efforts to break up the corporation.70
C. LEGAL RIGHTS
The World Bank provides a score on a scale of zero to twelve
for “Strength of Legal Rights” for corporate entities.71 The
average score is five and the United States received a score of
eleven.72 Only three countries, Montenegro, New Zealand, and
Colombia, received a score of twelve.73 Interestingly, all of these
countries also had above average FDI relative to their
populations.74
The World Bank describes the index as measuring “the
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the
rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending . . .
with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed
to expand access to credit.”75 The statistics are collected as part
66. In re Yukos Oil Co., 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
67. Id. at 132.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 138.
70. Jack Stubbs, Yukos Shareholders $50 Billion Win is Largest Arbitration
Award Ever: GML Director, REUTERS (July 28, 2014, 4:11 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-yukos-gml-idUSKBN0FX0O620140728.
71. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. New Zealand is one of the few
countries that sent more FDI than it received. Id.
75. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.

322

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

of a larger World Bank initiative known as the Doing Business
project,76 which measures business regulations and their
enforcement.77 Data is collected from 190 economies around the
world at the national, regional, and city level.78
A separate scoring metric was used by the Centre for
Business Development at the University of Cambridge to track
long-term development of creditor protection in the United
States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany.79 The study
provided a score for creditor protections on a scale of zero to one
from 1970–2005.80 The study evaluated a variety of factors,
including insolvency procedures, which were further scored
within nineteen variables.81 Comparing these scores to World
Bank FDI statistics shows a clear connection between
development of insolvency laws and higher FDI figures in the
countries that were evaluated.82
The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian
Development Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development have recognized the importance of insolvency laws
in long-term development goals.83 These organizations generally
require recipients of funding to enact insolvency reforms as a
condition of aid.84 The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development states that “sustainable market development
requires access to affordable credit. Capital investment can only
happen in an environment where parties can manage the
insolvency risk associated with credit relationships.”85 FDI is an
important source of capital investment, particularly in

76. Id.
77. About Doing Business, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.doingbusiness.
org/about-us (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
78. Id.
79. Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica & Prabirjit Sarkar, Varieties of Creditor
Protection: Insolvency Law Reform and Credit Expansion in Developed Market
Economies (Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 473,
2015).
80. Id. at 11–12.
81. Id. at 8 (giving examples of evaluated variables that include the
triggering of insolvency, appointment of bankruptcy trustees, and prioritization
of creditor groups in liquidation proceedings).
82. Compare id. at 12, with WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
83. Parry & Zhang, supra note 22, at 89.
84. Id. at 90.
85. Debt Restructuring and Bankruptcy International Standards,
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV, http://www.ebrd.com/what-wedo/sectors/legal-reform/debt-restructuring-and-bankruptcy/internationalstandards.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2016).
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developing countries with limited internal resources.86 While a
variety of factors influence FDI, the development of insolvency
laws in a stable legal system is essential for significant increases
in FDI figures.
II. ANALYSIS
A variety of factors can be used to evaluate how corporations
and individuals approach decisions for FDI. Legal issues,
especially insolvency and bankruptcy, have often been
overlooked as a factor. In general, investors are looking for a
system that is predictable and efficient with a variety of legal
rights for creditors.87 Diplomatic and geopolitical connections
are also significant factors that can sometimes counterbalance a
lack of the other factors being present in an FDI decision.
In order to adjust the data for differences in overall wealth
and relative size of each economy, the figures in this paper are
created by dividing the FDI figure for each country by its GDP,
which shows FDI as a percentage of GDP. The data shown in the
figures uses locally-weighted scatterplot-smoothed analysis
(LOWESS) to show how many countries correspond to each legal
rights value. The LOWESS analysis also includes a trend line to
illustrate correlation.
A useful starting point to evaluate the impact of legal rights
of creditors on FDI is the group of twenty largest economies in
the world, known as the G20. The G20 consists of meetings
between national leaders and finance ministers.88 There is no
formal voting or authority, but it is instead a forum for
discussion of issues.89 Among G20 countries there is a general
pattern that higher creditor rights scores indicate higher FDI
amounts.90 For example, countries with an average legal rights
86. Patrick Del Duca et al., U.S. Debt Markets Meet the Emerging Markets:
Legal Challenges Faced by Cross-Border Lenders, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS, supra note 32, at
501 (concluding that businesses in emerging markets use United States
financial markets for FDI, debt, and finance due to resources not being available
or not having as advantageous of terms in their home countries).
87. See Parry & Zhang, supra note 22, at 85.
88. There are nineteen states on the list with the twentieth member being
the European Union. Jamil Mustafa, What is the G20 and How Does It Work?,
THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/0/whatis-the-g20-and-how-does-it-work.
89. Id.
90. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2; WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
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score of five had just over $8 billion in average FDI for 2015
while countries with an average score of eleven had almost $300
billion in average FDI for 2015.91 Figure 1 illustrates the
correlation of FDI and legal rights among G20 countries. See
Figure 1 (figures located in appendix).92
The United Nations Committee for Development Policy
provides a list of “least developed countries” (LDCs).93 The list is
created based on the factors of per capita income, human assets,
and economic vulnerability.94 The United Nations encourages
trade concessions for countries with this designation.95 The
concession of development financing is especially relevant as it
encourages grants and loans from donors and financial
institutions.96 Accessibility of loans for businesses and projects
is certainly a factor with a significant influence on FDI.97
It is interesting to note that among countries designated as
LDCs, legal rights in themselves are not a significant factor in
determining FDI levels.98 See Figure 2.99 However, there is a
correlation between the recovery rate of creditors and the legal

91. Id.
92. See List of Least Developed Countries (as of June 2017), UNITED
NATIONS COMM. FOR DEV. POL’Y,http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf; World Bank World Development Indicators,
Financial access, Stability, and Efficiency (2016) http://wdi.worldbank.org/
table/5.5.; WORLD BANK, supra note 2; WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; Jamil
Mustafa, supra note 88. Locally-weighted scatterplot-smoothed analysis
(LOWESS) shows how many countries correspond to each legal rights value and
includes a trend line to illustrate correlation between the legal rights score and
FDI as a percentage of GDP.
93. The list currently contains forty-eight countries. List of Least Developed
Countries (as of June 2017), UNITED NATIONS COMM. FOR DEV. POL’Y,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/
publication/ldc_list.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2017).
94. Per Capita income is defined as gross national income per capita.
Human assets are based on indicators of nutrition, health, school enrollment,
and literacy. Economic vulnerability is defined as indicators of natural and
trade-related shocks, physical and economic exposure to shocks, and smallness
and remoteness. UN recognition of Least Developed Countries (LDC), UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., http://unctad.org/en/Pages/
ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-recognition-of-LDCs.aspx (last
visited Sept. 15, 2017).
95. Id. Concessions include development financing, preferential trade, and
technical assistance.
96. Id.
97. See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., supra note 85.
98. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
99. Id.
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rights index.100 In general, higher scores on the legal rights
index lead to higher recovery rates per dollar.101 For example,
LDCs with a score of ten for legal rights have an average
recovery rate per dollar of $0.35 while LDCs with a score of zero
for legal rights have an average recovery rate per dollar of just
$0.04.102 See Figure 3.103 While legal rights in themselves do not
seem to directly impact FDI in LDCs, the recovery rate per dollar
is certainly a factor that would be considered by those exploring
FDI in LDCs.104
There are currently 119 countries that are not part of the
G20 or an LDC.105 When comparing legal rights and FDI there
is a clear correlation between the two. See Figure 4.106
A. PREDICTABILITY
It is well-recognized that “effective and predictable rules of
insolvency create a better environment for FDI.”107 In the United
States, legal rights of creditors do not fluctuate significantly over
time.108 As noted by at least one commentator “[a]bsence of
predictability is a disincentive for FDI.”109 Lenders are more
likely to extend credit where the outcomes of insolvency are more
predictable and subject to “known parameters” of law.110
100. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.
org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
101. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS, supra note 100; THE WORLD
BANK, supra note 2.
102. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS, supra note 100; THE WORLD
BANK, supra note 2.
103. Id.
104. See Steven J. Arsenault, Leaping Over the Great Wall: Examining
Cross-Border Insolvency in China Under the Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy
Law, 21 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011).
105. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/
GDP.pdf; G20, supra note 88; Least Developed Countries supra note 93.
106. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
107. Fernando Locatelli, International Trade and Insolvency: Is the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil?,
REVISTA DO MINISTERIO PUBLICO DO RS, PORTO ALEGRE (2009), http://
www.amprs.com.br/public/arquivos/revista_artigo/arquivo_1259072860.pdf.
108. See WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2.
109. Hale E. Sheppard, The New Mexican Insolvency Law: Policy
Justifications for U.S. Assistance, 6 UCLA J. INT’L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 45 (2001).
110. Felicity Deane and Rosalind Mason, The UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency and the Rule of Law, 25 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 138
(2016).
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Lenders also favor jurisdictions with courts that have experience
and specialization in bankruptcy.111 For example, the United
States has a system of courts where judges exclusively hear
bankruptcy cases. At least one evaluator ranks the United
States insolvency process fairly low in its development of
creditor rights.112 However, the United States has a system that
is stable and predictable over time compared to the other
countries in the study.113
While China has a fairly developed bankruptcy procedure,
how its court system addresses bankruptcy can be
unpredictable, which inhibits FDI. One example that drew much
attention involved the bankruptcy proceedings of Eastern Star
Airlines.114 Despite the airline negotiating amicable settlements
with all of its creditors in order to work toward restructuring, a
Chinese court still ordered that the company be liquidated and
dissolved.115 This example of unpredictability is a significant
factor that has led to China being ranked fairly low in its rights
of creditors according to the World Bank.116 Even states with
high ratings in creditor rights may still impede investment if the
system is unpredictable.117
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are a common method
to improve predictability and provide protection for investors
engaging in FDI.118 In the United States, they are specifically
designed to “protect private investment, to develop marketoriented policies in partner countries, and to promote United
States exports.”119 A BIT between the United States and
Ecuador “recognizes that parties may protect the rights of
creditors . . . .”120 A similar provision is found in the BIT between
111. Id.
112. Deakin, supra note 79.
113. Id.
114. Yujia Jiang, The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China:
A Comparative Study of U.S. and Chinese Bankruptcy Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 559, 580–81 (2014).
115. Id.
116. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2.
117. Jon Ruiss, Insolvency Laws of Romania and Ukraine: Why Romania’s
Insolvency Laws Work Better for Foreign Direct Investment, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 759 (2012).
118. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last
visited Sept. 9, 2017).
119. Id.
120. Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, art. IV, ¶ 3, Aug.
27,
1993,
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/
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the United States and Morocco.121 A BIT between the United
States and Jordan goes further in describing restrictions on FDI
transfers.122 It specifically allows each contracting party to
prevent transfers in order to apply laws of “bankruptcy,
insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors.”123
Although studies have produced mixed results, in general, the
implementation of BITS have resulted in increased FDI levels
for participating countries.124
B. EFFICIENCY
The efficiency of a country’s insolvency procedures also
impacts FDI. In the United States, all creditors are treated
equally, unlike some systems which use a “race to the
courthouse” approach in distributing payments to creditors.125
The system encourages negotiation and overall fairness toward
respective creditors.126 In addition, United States bankruptcy
petitions are automatically accepted at the time of filing and do
not need formal acceptance from a court.127 This creates a fairly
predictable process. In contrast to this approach is China’s
bankruptcy process. While bankruptcy laws are fairly developed,
Chinese courts have broad discretion in whether to even accept
a bankruptcy petition.128 Chinese bankruptcy and procedural
codes provide no guidance to courts on this important procedural
Equador_BIT_AG.asp.
121. Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Morocco, art. IV, ¶ 3(c), Jul.
22, 1985. http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_
005864.asp.
122. Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Jordan, art. V, ¶ 4(a), Jul. 2,
1997,
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_
005590.asp.
123. Id.
124. Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 146 (2005).
125. Wielebinski & Rukavina, supra note 21, at 694. “Race to the
Courthouse” is a common term used in the field to describe a practice in which
the first creditors to file their claim with the court are paid first. Each
subsequent creditor is then paid in the order filed until the court has distributed
all money it determines can be paid by the insolvent debtor.
126. P.J. Kozyris, Report for the United States of America, in CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY, supra note 5, at 244 (describing the United States bankruptcy
process as shifting “from legalistic to economic approaches”).
127. Id. at 245.
128. Anna Ansari, The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s
Republic of China: A Further Step Toward the Creation of a Modern Insolvency
Framework, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 art. 1, 10 (2011).

328

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

matter.129 Even with an updated bankruptcy code,
unpredictability in acceptance of bankruptcy petitions by a court
creates a serious impediment for anyone considering FDI
opportunities in China who is using bankruptcy laws as a factor
in the decision-making process.130
Some countries intentionally improve efficiency by creating
expedited procedures for simpler bankruptcy proceedings. For
example, Switzerland has established “Summarized Bankruptcy
Proceedings” which allow for quick liquidation without formal
creditor meetings for simpler insolvencies.131 Switzerland’s
creditor rights score is around the average for its region, but is
also lower than one would expect compared to other world
financial centers.132 It still had a fairly high FDI amount for 2015
of nearly $98 billion.133 In 2005, France created shorter
“conciliation” proceedings for simpler bankruptcy cases.134 That
same year, it reached its record high FDI total of just over $85
billion.135 Predictable, simplified and efficient bankruptcy
procedures clearly influence FDI. More specifically, legislation
that simplifies otherwise complex or time-consuming procedures
generally results in higher FDI amounts.
C. DIPLOMATIC AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Diplomatic and geopolitical considerations also significantly
influence FDI decisions. There is often overlap between the top
sources of FDI inflow and destinations of FDI outflow. For
instance, the top five FDI inflow sources and FDI outflow
destinations for France include the Netherlands, United States,
Germany, and United Kingdom.136 In New Zealand, the top five
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Bader, supra note 4. The process also requires advance notification to
creditors who are allowed to demand that regular bankruptcy proceedings take
place.
132. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2. Switzerland’s creditor
rights score was six. Scores for other countries in the region include Germany
at six, France at four, and Austria at five.
133. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. Switzerland’s 2015 FDI was
$97,577,566,732.
134. Andrew Tetley & Marcel Bayle, Insolvency Law in France, in WORLD
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 199.
135. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. France’s 2005 FDI was
$85,179,159,787.
136. France and Monaco, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE
STATEMENTS (2016), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimate
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FDI inflow sources and FDI outflow destinations overlap with
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom
appearing on both lists.137
FDI inflow to countries with lower creditor and other legal
rights is generally from countries with close diplomatic ties.
Bahrain currently has a creditor rights score of one.138 The
country’s top sources of FDI inflow are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Libya, and the United Arab Emirates, which together account
for over eighty percent of FDI inflows.139 All of Bahrain’s sources
of FDI inflows, except for Libya, have at least slightly higher
levels of creditor rights.140 Despite Bahrain’s lack of creditor
rights, investors from countries with close diplomatic ties are
still willing to assume the higher risks of investment in
Bahrain.141
D. LEGAL RIGHTS
Investors often send FDI outflow to countries with higher
creditor rights rankings than their own. The United States
largest sources of FDI in 2015 were the United Kingdom, Japan,
Canada, Germany, France, Ireland, Switzerland, and
Netherlands.142 Together, these accounted for just over seventyfive percent of FDI inflows for the United States.143 All of these
countries had lower creditor rights rankings than the United
States with Japan, Germany, France, Ireland, Switzerland, and
especially the Netherlands having significantly lower levels of
creditor rights.144
statements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=254363.
137. New Zealand, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE
STATEMENTS (2016), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimate
statements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=254303.
138. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2.
139. Bahrain, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENTS
(2016),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/
index.htm?year=2016&dlid=254435
140. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2. Creditor rights scores
are Kuwait-2, Saudi Arabia-2, Libya-0, and United Arab Emirates-2. Id.
141. Id.
142. ORG. FOR INT’L INV., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (2016), http://www.ofii.org/.
143. Id.
144. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2 (scoring the United
States at eleven, the United Kingdom at seven, Japan at four, Canada at nine,
Germany at six, France at four, Ireland at seven, Switzerland at six, and the
Netherlands at three).
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China provides an interesting illustration of the concept
working the other way as well, in that those investing in
developing countries with lower levels of creditor rights tend to
be from the most developed countries.145 China’s top sources of
FDI inflows are Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Japan,
Singapore, and the United States.146 While a separate legal
rights score is not available for Hong Kong or the British Virgin
Islands, Singapore and the United States have significantly
higher levels of creditor rights than China.147 This data suggests
that investors from less-developed countries are generally not
willing to assume the risks of investing within the stilldeveloping Chinese financial system.148
E. EXAMPLES OF INSOLVENCY LAW DIRECTLY IMPACTING FDI
This section provides a few examples of insolvency and
bankruptcy laws having a direct impact on FDI. Changes that
improve creditor rights or predictability generally result in
increases to FDI figures the same year the change is
implemented or shortly after once the new policy is better
publicized or understood.149 In contrast, changes that are seen
as reducing creditor rights, even minimally, can cause longlasting harm in the form of reduced FDI amounts.150
The World Bank Doing Business project provides several
suggestions and guidelines for broad policy changes to
bankruptcy laws.151 It suggests that improving reorganization
procedures reduces failure rates among firms.152 Bankruptcy
procedures can also impact loan terms, leverage ratios, and bank
145. China, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENTS
(2016),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/
index.htm?year=2016&dlid=254271.
146. Id.
147. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2 (giving creditor scores
for China of four, Singapore, eight, United States, eleven). Japan received the
same score as China. Id.
148. Cf. Del Duca, supra note 86.
149. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; see also WORLD BANK FINANCIAL
ACCESS, supra note 2.
150. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; see also WORLD BANK FINANCIAL
ACCESS, supra note 2.
151. DOING BUSINESS, REFORMING THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN
2015/16, at 38 (2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/Doing
Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Chapters/DB17Reforming-the-Business-Environment-in-2015-2016.pdf.
152. Id.

2018]

CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY LAWS & FDI

331

recovery rates.153 During 2015 and 2016, the World Bank reports
that at least twenty-four countries had enacted significant
bankruptcy reforms including some conducted at the regional
level.154
1. France
While FDI figures vary significantly from one year to
another, there is an overall increase in France’s FDI from 1970–
2015.155 Interestingly, legal rights of creditors also varied during
this time.156 During times of lower rights for creditors, FDI also
decreases.157 For example, from 2000–2005, the average debtor
control score dropped to its lowest point since at least 1970.158
France’s highest FDI ever received occurred in 2005 and has had
an overall pattern of decline since that time.159 The data
suggests that as the score dropped, so did investor confidence in
the predictability of the system and that the damage is
ongoing.160 From 1984–1990, there was an increase in overall
creditor rights.161 In 1984, the FDI for France was just over $2
billion while in 1990 it was just over $13 billion.162 These figures
indicate that improvements to legal rights of creditors leads to
increased FDI whereas lowering levels of creditor rights, even
due to seemingly minor changes, can have lasting impacts on
FDI decisions.163

153. Id.
154. Id. The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa
created uniform cross-border insolvency procedures for seventeen states. Id.
155. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. FDI in 1970 was $621,212,781, 1990
was $13,183,285,334, and 2010 was $38,899,924,637. Id.
156. Deakin, supra note 79. While aggregate legal rights improved, the
ability of creditors to control debtor activity during bankruptcy in order to
preserve assets declined slightly. The score from 1980-1984 was 0.49. From
1985-1989, the score dropped to 0.46. It dropped to 0.45 in the period of 20002005. Id.
157. See Id.
158. Id.
159. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
160. Id.
161. Deakin, supra note 79. The average aggregate score for creditor rights
from 1980-1984 was 0.46 and from 1985-1989 the score increased to 0.50. Id.
162. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
163. See Deakin, supra note 79; see also WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
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2. United States

In 2005, the United State Bankruptcy Code was updated to
incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law.164 This update made
United States recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings
more predictable.165 In 2007, the United States reached its
highest FDI inflow amount since 2000 which was not surpassed
until 2015.166 The improved predictability of an already welldeveloped bankruptcy code seems to have had an impact on FDI
levels as the new provisions were implemented.
3. New Zealand
After a seven year review, New Zealand passed the
Companies Amendment Act of 2006.167 Prior to the Act,
bankruptcy proceedings generally required unanimous
agreement of settlements with creditors or complete
liquidation.168 The Act provided alternative procedures allowing
for reorganization of an insolvent entity.169 The law came into
force in 2007.170 New Zealand also experienced its highest FDI
levels on record in 2007.171 Investors seem to have been
influenced by the changes to New Zealand’s improved
bankruptcy process which resulted in the record FDI levels.
4. Russia
In October of 2002, Russia passed legislation rewriting their
insolvency laws to bring them in line with modern international
standards.172 Further updates were made over several years and
the law was formally implemented in 2009.173 Even though the
provisions were not formally implemented until later, the
preliminary legislation reforming insolvency laws led to

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

O’Flynn, supra note 50 at 396.
Id. at 398.
WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
Tetley, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509.
WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.
See Kurochkin, supra note 4.
Id.
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increased FDI.174 In 2003, FDI levels rose significantly,175 and in
2004, they nearly doubled from their 2003 levels.176 Even
preliminary work toward insolvency law reform can impact FDI
levels as corporations see improvement to existing legal
procedures.177
5. European Union
The European Union provides a broader overview of the
same concept. While each member has its own bankruptcy laws,
the European Union also has regulations for cross-border
insolvency in European Council Regulation 1346/2000.178 Some
of the provisions include guidelines for determining jurisdiction
and full recognition of foreign proceedings.179 These guidelines
improve predictability of cross-border insolvency proceedings at
the regional level.180 Europe also has the second-highest legal
rights score of any region with only North America receiving a
higher score.181 The result of the combined rights of creditors and
increased predictability in cross-border insolvency is that the
European Union accounts for twenty-nine percent of global FDI
and receives just over $20 billion more in FDI than North
America.182
6. China
China provides an interesting exception to the pattern of
bankruptcy laws leading to increases in FDI. In 2007, China
implemented numerous reforms to update its bankruptcy
process.183 Oddly, the number of bankruptcies declined as the

174. See e.g., WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. FDI in 2002 was
$1,144,000,000. FDI in 2003 was $1,844,000,000. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. FDI in 2004 was $15,402,990,000. Id.
177. See id.; Kurochkin, supra note 4.
178. Emmanuel Roger France & Tim Van Canneyt, Belgian Insolvency Law,
in WORLD INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 41, 76–77.
179. See id. at 77.
180. Id.
181. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2. Europe’s overall score
is six while North America’s is ten.
182. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. The European Union’s FDI total for
2015 was $580,656,109,603. North America’s was $560,720,286,845. Id.
183. See Jiang, supra note 114, at 560.
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new policies were implemented.184 Despite China’s population,
it has significantly fewer bankruptcy filings than comparable
countries.185 In 2009, the United States had 1,473,675
bankruptcy filings while China only had 2,434.186 While there is
a slight increase in FDI after 2007, by 2016, FDI had returned
to being very similar to the levels received in 2008 and only
slightly higher than the 2007 figures.187
There are additional issues with China in its requirements
and procedures for managers of companies experiencing
insolvency. Individual managers are generally forbidden from
leaving the country and are subject to civil penalties for
insolvency.188 In addition, government-appointed liquidation
panels, which can speak on behalf of management, often consist
of bureaucrats rather than financial and legal professionals.189
For example, during the reorganization of one company, a 24
member panel consisted of one accountant, one lawyer, and a
myriad of government officials including several mayors and an
administrator for a government environmental agency.190 While
the official laws allow for broad creditor protections, the
approach to management and use of a bureaucratic process
rather than a judicial one hinders the implementation of the
rights that are alleged to exist.
While reforms were enacted, the reality was that they were
merely a façade on the same system. The reforms also only
addressed insolvency of corporations and not of individuals.191
Corruption is still prevalent in Chinese courts which obviously
leads to unpredictable and contradictory bankruptcy
outcomes.192 In addition, the process of registering a business in
China is often quite difficult.193 While China’s FDI rates are
fairly stable, they are small, relative to the country’s

184. Id. at 561.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3.In 2007, FDI was $156,249,335,203
and increased to $290928431467 by 2013. But by 2016, FDI had returned to
$170,556,525,654, which is very similar to its 2008 FDI of $171,534,650,311 and
only slightly higher than 2007. Id.
188. Jiang, supra note 114 at 579.
189. See id. at 579–80.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 564.
192. Ansari, supra note 128.
193. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 145.
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population.194 The combination of unpredictability in
bankruptcy outcomes and inefficiency within the courts has
prevented China from experiencing the full benefits of increased
FDI as a result of improved bankruptcy procedures.195
III. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law has
significantly influenced cross-border insolvency. There are
several examples of cases in which United States courts deferred
to decisions of foreign courts in addressing specific cross-border
insolvencies. Studies and recommendations from the World
Bank have influenced recent legislative changes in how
countries address cross-border insolvency.
Insolvency laws have usually been overlooked as a variable
in how FDI decisions are reached. A comparison of legal rights
of creditors with FDI statistics shows a direct correlation
between improvements to insolvency and bankruptcy laws and
higher FDI amounts. Investors are looking for stability and
predictability in the event of the failure of a business venture.
States with higher ratings for legal rights generally also have
higher rates of FDI. While a variety of factors influence FDI, it
is clear that the development of insolvency and bankruptcy laws
is a significant factor considered by investors that has usually
been overlooked.

194. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. China’s FDI inflows in 2015 were
$242,489,331,627 compared to the United States FDI figure of
$506,161,000,000. Id.
195. See e.g., Ansari, supra note 128.
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Appendix: Figures 1-4

Strength of Country Legal Rights
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